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FOREWORD
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia. The tragic selfimmolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in December
2010 struck a chord of discontent and frustration that
ultimately propelled Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to step down barely a month later. The
reverberations of this unprecedented series of events
were felt throughout the region, and protestors took
to the streets in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria,
and Yemen. A year later, Tunisia’s remarkable transition continues to influence the region.
Tunisia has achieved in 1 year what none of the
other Arab Spring states have been able to accomplish.
Some have suggested that Tunisia’s transition might
even be a model for the Arab Spring countries. The
Tunisian military’s refusal to fire on the demonstrators and its decision to eschew an overtly political role
in the transition have left the task of creating a new
political order in Tunisia to the civilian bureaucracy,
nascent political parties, and civil society groups. In
national elections widely heralded to be free and fair,
Tunisians elected a caretaker government and a National Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a
new constitution for Tunisia in 2012.
In this monograph, Dr. Querine Hanlon of the
National Defense University and the United States
Institute of Peace finds that Tunisia is well poised to
undertake serious security sector reform (SSR). SSR
is a comprehensive tool for fixing the dysfunctional
security sectors in fragile states emerging from conflict, developing capacities to meet the human security needs of their populations, or transitioning from
authoritarian rule. In many fragile states, the security
institutions are themselves a major source of insecurity. Dr. Hanlon argues that transforming the security
iii

sector into one that is democratically accountable and
functions in accordance with the rule of law is an important step toward averting the recurrence of insecurity and conflict and preventing newly democratic or
transitioning regimes from reverting to authoritarian
rule.
Although the prospects for SSR in Tunisia are perhaps better than in any other Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) state following the Arab Spring, substantial challenges remain. Dr. Hanlon argues that the
raison d’être of Ben Ali’s security institutions was to
protect the regime, not the population. The abuses of
Tunisia’s internal security institutions and the impunity with which they acted against ordinary citizens
served as a catalyst for the protests that ended Ben
Ali’s rule. Reforming or otherwise dismantling this
large and complex sector will be no easy task. The
transition to democratic rule will require a fundamental reorientation of the mandate and institutional culture of the labyrinth of security institutions that constitute the Tunisian security sector. SSR will be critical
for building trust in the government and its security
institutions and central to the construct of a national
narrative that undergirds a new social contract between the people of Tunisia and its government.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on the
role of SSR in transforming the security sectors in the
transitioning Arab Spring countries in accordance
with democratic principles and the rule of law.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In the year since the revolution, Tunisia has
achieved what no other Arab Spring country has managed: peaceful transition to democratic rule through
national elections widely viewed to be free and fair.
The legacy of the previous regime, however, remains:
a complete lack of transparency, no real parliamentary or government oversight, and largely unchanged
rules of engagement and training. Tunisia’s internal
security services are feared by the population and
are themselves fearful of fulfilling their basic policing
tasks. The Tunisian Armed Forces clearly ascribe to
the concept of civilian oversight of the military. Although they are currently fulfilling a number of internal security tasks, they have publicly stated their
intention to return to the barracks when the police can
resume responsibility for internal security. Security
sector reform (SSR) will be critical for building trust in
the new government and its security institutions. The
raison d’être of Ben Ali’s security institutions was to
protect the regime, not the population. SSR is essential
for reorienting the mandate and institutional culture
of Tunisia’s labyrinth of security institutions. Serious
reform of the security sector is essential if Tunisia’s
transition to democratic rule is to succeed in the long
term.
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THE PROSPECTS FOR
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN TUNISIA:
A YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Mohammed Bouazizi’s altercation with a policewoman in the dusty town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on
December 17, 2010, was ordinary in its arbitrariness,
but extraordinary for what it sparked. After spitting in
and slapping his face, a local policewoman confiscated Bouazizi's vegetable cart—and all its goods bought
on credit—and in so doing threatened his livelihood
and the sole means of support for his entire family.
Bouazizi tried to appeal to the local municipal officials, but they refused to see him. With little education
and no prospect of another job, the 26-year-old man
set himself on fire in front of the municipal headquarters building.1 He succumbed to his wounds in the
hospital on January 4, 2011, 10 days before Tunisian
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was forced to step
down.
Bouazizi’s tragic protest struck a chord of discontent and frustration that sparked public demonstrations throughout Tunisia. The initial demonstrations
took place on the day of Bouazizi’s self-immolation in
Sidi Bouzid and by late December had spread to the
nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala. On January 12,
demonstrations began in the capital of Tunis. What
had begun as an outpouring of frustration and protest over poor economic conditions, and particularly
high youth unemployment, rapidly escalated into an
unprecedented challenge to Ben Ali’s 23-year rule.
The internal security services—the police and the
National Guard—responded in force. While some
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protests were largely peaceful, others turned violent.
Police opened fire on crowds and arrested protestors,
journalists and opposition party members, lawyers,
and rights advocates. But the police response failed
to quell the protests. On January 13, Ben Ali made a
last-ditch attempt to save his rule. On national television, he pledged to step down when his term ended in
2014, offered new parliamentary elections, and vowed
to end state censorship. But with the carrot came the
stick. He deployed the military to buttress the internal
security forces and, on January 14, declared a state of
emergency that prohibited gatherings of more than
three people and authorized the use of force against
any individuals who ignored the ban.
Then General Rachid Ammar, Chief of Staff of
the Army, struck a mortal blow. He said “No.” The
military’s refusal to fire on the demonstrators left Ben
Ali with no means to quash the demonstrators forcibly, and he fled to Saudi Arabia that same day.2 In
the immediate aftermath of his departure, there were
numerous reports of violence between the security
services and rogue elements. Elsewhere the police
fled, and the Army was deployed to maintain order
on the streets—assuming the internal security tasks of
securing the population, manning checkpoints, and
protecting strategic sites and public buildings.3 Unlike the case of Egypt, however, the Tunisian military
chose to stay at the critical margins. In a rare public
address on January 24, General Ammar promised to
uphold Tunisia’s revolution and to guarantee stability
until elections were held.4 The military’s critical decision to eschew an overtly political role in the transition left the task of creating a new political order to
the civilian bureaucracy, nascent political parties, and
civil society groups.
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Tunisia’s new government faces major challenges
to dismantle Ben Ali’s security regime and to ensure
the transition to democratic rule with civilian oversight over the instruments of force. The abuses of
Tunisia’s internal security institutions and the impunity with which they acted against ordinary citizens
served as a catalyst for the protests that ended Ben
Ali’s rule. Reforming or otherwise dismantling this
large and complex sector will be no easy task. But it
is an essential component of constructing a new social
contract in Tunisia.
WHY SECURITY SECTOR REFORM?
Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive
tool for fixing the dysfunctional security sectors in
fragile states that are emerging from conflict, developing capacities to meet the human security needs of
their populations, or transitioning from authoritarian
rule.5 SSR is also an important tool for the prevention of conflict. In many fragile states, the security
institutions are themselves a major source of insecurity. Transforming the security sector into one that is
democratically accountable and functions in accordance with the rule of law is an important step toward
averting the recurrence of insecurity and conflict and
preventing newly democratic or transitioning regimes
from reverting to authoritarian rule.
The SSR agenda is an ambitious one. SSR aims to
address a range of security-related challenges. These
include: 1) the lack of statutory security providers due
to inadequate institutions, poor training, or corruption; 2) the presence of armed nonstate actors, gangs,
and other nonstatutory security providers; 3) the absence of legitimate and effective formal or informal
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justice institutions; and 4) the lack of effective, transparent governance of the security sector. Yet, how
these challenges present themselves in a particular
fragile state will vary according to legacies of conflict;
tribal, ethnic, or religious patterns; systems of government; colonial legacies; the level of economic development; environmental conditions; the vibrancy of civil
society; and transnational influences, to name but a
few. In other words, there is no formula for SSR that
will be applicable to all states.
Tunisia is well positioned to undertake SSR. With
a small territory and relatively homogeneous population, Tunisia features a large and educated middle
class, a liberalized economy, a youth bulge that is
diminishing, and a history of encouraging socioeconomic freedoms, particularly for women.6 For example, Tunisian election law mandates that party lists
be comprised equally of both male and female candidates. Twenty-seven percent of the members of the
National Constituent Assembly are women. Women
serve in the military and constitute more than 50 percent of university students. Additionally, despite the
significant constraints on speech and protest, Tunisia
under Ben Ali featured both legal and illegal opposition parties, and a range of civil society groups that
engaged in muted opposition to the government.
Tunisia has a vibrant legal community, a bar association, a lawyers union, and civil society groups,
many of which were active even under Ben Ali. Civil
society activists under Ben Ali were able to monitor
the government’s activities through the publication
of laws and amendments, as well as appointments.
Tunisia also has a well-developed legal code that, in
principle, proscribes the functions of the government.
There are 1,700 laws and amendments that govern the
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security sector alone (there is no legislation governing
the intelligence sector). Although the extent to which
these laws are still in effect is as yet unclear, they do
provide a foundation on which to reform the security
sector and its oversight mechanisms.
Tunisia also has significant security capacity. Although the country is small in size relative to other
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states, its
armed forces have ably filled the vacuum created by
the collapse of Ben Ali’s security apparatus and the
defections of police throughout the country. While
providing internal security, the armed forces have
also secured the maritime and land borders, countered
cross-border incursions from Libyan armed groups,
and established five refugee camps for 1.6 million
refugees, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, fleeing the
violence in Libya.7 The armed forces clearly ascribe to
the concept of civilian oversight of the military, and although they are currently fulfilling a number of internal security tasks, they have publicly, and repeatedly,
stated their intention to return to the barracks when
the police can again fulfill their security functions.
One of the most striking features in Tunisian society, even a year after the revolution, is the veritable
explosion of public discourse and debate. As one
senior military officer noted, Tunisians “never used
to talk about politics. Now we talk about politics all
the time. We have so much freedom now. We almost
don’t know what to do with it.”8 Every evening, Tunisia’s three television stations devote their evening
programming to debates on every subject imaginable.
Recently, for example, a long debate between the President of the Tunisian League for Human Rights and a
salafist student addressed the right to wear the niqab
(the Muslim face veil for women) at school. “Tunisia
has become a debating society,” Radwan Masmoudi,
5

Director of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, observed.9
Another metric of change is the number of political parties. Under Ben Ali there were five official political parties. During the October 2011 election, there
were 111. A civil society activist told us that “all Tunisians are learning what democracy is and how it really works. We don’t really have political parties, and
the parties we have don’t really know yet how to act
like parties or what role they should play in the opposition.”10 Yet, these parties competed for seats in the
National Constituent Assembly in Tunisia’s first postrevolutionary elections, which were widely heralded
to be free and fair.
Civil society has also burgeoned. Some 2,000 new
civil society groups have emerged in Tunisia since the
revolution. Although many of these groups are still
virtual, they are pushing for a voice in the Tunisian
transition—demanding transparency, and fueling
the Tunisian “debating society,” particularly among
Tunisian youth. According to Omar Mestiri, director
of Radio Kalima, “post-revolutionary media is now
delivering journalist materials more representative
of Tunisian society. Now, there is more space for different opinions and dialogue.”11 In the year since the
fall of Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia gained four new cable
channels, 12 radio stations, and 18 newspapers.12
Although the prospects for SSR in Tunisia are perhaps better than in any other MENA state following
the Arab Spring, substantial challenges remain.13 The
raison d’être of Ben Ali’s security institutions was to
protect the regime, not the population. The transition
to democratic rule will require a fundamental reorientation of the mandate and institutional culture of the
labyrinth of security institutions that constitute the
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Tunisian security sector. SSR will be critical for building trust in the government and its security institutions and central to the construct of a national narrative that undergirds a new social contract between the
people of Tunisia and its government.
MAPPING TUNISIA’S SECURITY SECTOR
What are the prospects for SSR in Tunisia? What
progress has been made in the year since the fall of
the Ben Ali regime? What gaps remain, and how best
can these gaps be addressed? To answer these questions, we will map the security sector in Tunisia, assess the status of reform efforts currently underway,
if any, and identify gaps. Four categories of actors,
institutions, and functions comprise Tunisia’s security sector: (1) statutory security providers; (2) governance and democratic oversight; (3) justice and the
rule of law; and (4) civil society. We will conclude by
proposing additional steps that the Tunisian government and the international community can undertake
to address those gaps, realize Tunisia’s security sector
transformation, and support the country’s transition
to democratic rule.
Statutory Security Providers.
Statutory security providers typically include all
state institutions with a formal mandate to ensure the
safety of the state and its citizens, such as the armed
forces, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, and
border and customs guards. In Tunisia, the statutory
security providers are part of the Ministry of National
Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior and Local
Development (MOI). There are also forces assigned to
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the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The intelligence capabilities are assigned to the Ministries of Defense, Interior,
and Foreign Affairs.
The Armed Forces. The Tunisian Armed Forces
(Forces Armees Tunisiens) are small, well disciplined,
and widely respected for their refusal to follow orders
to use lethal force against their countrymen. Their inaction makes them stand out compared to the armed
forces of other MENA nations. They are unique in the
region for other reasons as well. The Tunisian military,
unlike the armed forces of other MENA countries, is
completely subordinate to the government and controlled by it. Consequently, the Tunisian armed forces
never played a political role, nor did they legitimize
the former regime.14 Additionally, Tunisia’s armed
forces are not economically invested in the old regime.
Unlike the Egyptian military, Tunisia’s armed forces
did not receive any special compensation or material
advantages for their service to the state.15
In discussions with senior members of the armed
forces, they openly admit that in Ben Ali’s hierarchy
of security institutions, they were at the bottom. “We
were always last,” noted one senior officer. “The regime did not like us,” another noted. Indeed, in my
conversations with military officers, it became clear
that the military’s distance from the regime was deliberately created by President Bourguiba, Tunisia’s
founding president, who feared a possible coup and
sought to institutionalize the military’s distance from
the center of power.16 Ben Ali, who was himself a former Interior Minister, continued this policy, while
buttressing the capabilities and size of the MOI security forces.
Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali kept the armed forces
deliberately out of the center of power. Conscript-
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filled military ranks were deployed to less-populated
regions of the country to do public works projects.
Deployments were chiefly for peacekeeping missions
in Africa, which kept the armed forces engaged elsewhere. A generation of officers was educated in the
war colleges and command and staff colleges in the
United States through International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP). The military was kept
small, numbering between 40,000 and 43,000 forces.
The Tunisian Armed Forces include the Army,
Navy, and the Air Force. The Army numbers only
27,000 soldiers, and the Navy has no deep-water
ships. The Air Force has less than 20 working helicopters and only 20 combat capable aircraft.17 Yet, the
Army’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions gave it the essential experience to
fill the void left by the security forces as Ben Ali’s government collapsed. The armed forces quickly moved
to protect key infrastructure, restore law and order,
and maintain security and stability. A year after the
revolution, 18,000 soldiers continue to guard some 700
buildings and vital installations. In addition to assuming traditional internal security functions, the armed
forces also face serious challenges along Tunisia’s
land and maritime borders. Some 1.6 million refugees
from Libya’s civil war, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, crossed into Tunisia, and some 30,000 Tunisians
fled to Lampedusa, an island off the coast of Italy.18
The stark contrast between the impunity of the internal security services and the measured restraint of
the armed forces is reflected in how the two organizations are publicly viewed. Whereas the security forces
are reviled and hated, the armed forces are viewed as
belonging to the people. “The Army is one of us!” has
been a rallying cry at demonstrations.
9

Compared to those of other MENA nations, the Tunisian Armed Forces were also funded at much lower
levels in both absolute and relative terms as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). For example, in
2009, Tunisian military expenditures were 1.2 percent
of GDP, whereas Libya and Egypt’s military spending
was 2.8 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively.19 Ministry officials noted that both Bourguiba and Ben Ali
had kept the military’s capabilities small, but “sufficient for our mission.”
A year after the revolution, this assessment remains
unchanged. Ministry officials rank the priorities of the
Tunisian government to be economic, with national
security—particularly the control of borders—as subordinate. When asked whether the Tunisian military
has sufficient equipment to accomplish its expanded
mission since the revolution, the response was a surprising affirmative. “We have the manpower we need.
We managed to go through the revolution and do all
that we do with what we have. . . . We do not need
expensive weapons or aircraft—perhaps only helicopters.”20
In a formal ministry briefing, senior military officers noted that “the reform of the defense and the
security sector requires a political system based on
good governance.” In addition to a commitment to
transparency, officials noted that the Army must be
open to different political and social actors, and that
its budgets must be available for public scrutiny. “The
term ‘classified’ or ‘top secret’ must not constitute, under any condition, an obstacle to the transparency of
the defense budget.” They also embraced the concept
of democratic oversight, noting that it is “imperative”
that there be parliamentary oversight of reforms of the
Ministry and of the progress of those reforms.21
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In minimizing and sidelining the military, Ben Ali
created a professional, apolitical institution that was
little known—and little feared. Before General Ammar emerged a national hero, he was an unknown.
Yet, his actions propelled the Tunisian Armed Forces
to a position of preeminence—the institution that protected the Tunisian state and the Tunisian people, not
the corrupt regime. Having expressed a preference for
the barracks over politics, the armed forces emerged
as one of the only respected institutions of the previous regime.
The unique attributes of the Tunisian Armed
Forces—its credibility, commitment to assuming its
traditional functions, and its skill and willingness to
assume an internal peacekeeping mission—suggest
that the scope for reform of the military is very small.
There will be challenges adjusting to a democratic system of governance and parliamentary oversight. Yet,
the need for oversight is recognized and welcomed by
the senior officers we spoke to as being essential to
democratic governance. Another task will be a strategic one—military officers are keen to engage in the
drafting of national strategies now that the exercise
is no longer top down by fiat. Indeed, senior military
officers seek to expand their role as subject matter experts and to support civilian decisionmakers in the
ministry, as their counterparts do in most democratic
nations. The armed forces appear well poised to tackle
these tasks.
One senior military officer observed that the reform of any one ministry is closely tied to the reform
of other ministries, and that the reform of the Ministry
of Interior will be critical for determining how quickly
the armed forces can cease conducting internal security functions. But until the legitimacy and capacity of
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the MOI is addressed and improved, the armed forces
will likely continue to provide an internal security
function, although increasingly in a supporting role.
The Internal Security Forces. As much as the armed
forces are admired as the heroes of the revolution, the
police are widely reviled for keeping Ben Ali and his
family in power, for imprisioning and torturing Tunisians who ran afoul of that regime, and for shooting
civilians during the protests. During a recent visit, I
was told that the unpopularity of particular ministries can be measured by the amount of barbed wire
around their buildings. A year after the fall of Ben Ali,
the MOI was still surrounded by concertina wire a few
layers deep—more to protect those inside than to barricade the ministry. Army tanks also stood guard. The
impression was of a ministry under siege.
The internal security forces controlled by the MOI
include the police, the National Guard, the Judicial Police (which operates in the Ministry of Justice and the
courts, but is controlled by the Ministry of Interior),
the Intervention Forces (Special Weapons and Tactics
[SWAT] forces), and the Presidential Guard Forces.
The internal security forces are almost byzantine in
their complexity, and the organizational chart of the
MOI remains classified, which complicates the task of
mapping the internal security structures controlled by
the MOI, as well as the oversight mechanisms within
the Ministry.
It is also difficult to establish the size of the security
forces. There are no officially published statistics, and
the ministry website offers no details—it is the only
ministry on the Tunisian government website with an
empty tab. Media reports have estimated the security
forces to number from 150,000 to 200,000, although
subsequent ministry announcements acknowledged
that those numbers were deliberately inflated. Actual
12

internal security forces are estimated to number between 40,000 and 80,000, approximately half of which
are part-time augmentation forces or paid informants.
The higher figure accords with the ministry payroll.22
According to Mohammad Lazhar Akremi, the Minister Delegate to the Minister of Interior in Charge of
Reforms under the previous transitional government,
internal security forces (police, National Guard, and
civil defense forces) numbered 49,000 before the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. The police subsequently
recruited an additional 12,000 forces, bringing the total to 61,000.23 New recruits were needed to inject new
untainted officers into the force, to manage the rise in
crime, weapons, and drug trafficking, and to replace
the forces that had disappeared after the fall of the regime. However, the training program for these new
recruits has not been reformed.
The police include both the regular police and the
political police, which were reportedly disbanded during the transitional government of Beji Caid Essebsi in
March 2011. The political police were fully integrated
with the regular police, but operated under a parallel
hierarchy. The political police maintain the secret files;
two copies of each are currently kept at the Ministry of
Interior, where ministry officials claim they are safe.
However, individuals who have left the police or the
MOI have reported that files have been burned. Tunisian law currently prohibits publication of these files
for 50 years. Although not as extensive as the files of
some other totalitarian regimes, they contain a great
deal of potentially damaging and possibly false information. Who actually controls the files is unclear.24 The
release on January 18, 2012, of a video on YouTube
and Facebook depicting the newly appointed Minister of Interior, Ali Laarayedh, reportedly engaged in
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a sexual act in a prison cell suggests that it is not the
Minister of Interior who controls the files.25
Whereas the police operate mostly in urban areas,
the National Guard operates in the coastal and rural areas where the revolution began. Described as a
paramilitary organization or a gendarmerie, the National Guard numbers approximately 12,000. National
Guard forces man checkpoints, and there is a small
fleet of patrol boats for customs and border protection
operations. The Guard reportedly also has a counterterrorism capability consisting of the National Guard
Commando Group, the National Guard Special Unit,
and the Tunisian Anti-Terrorism Brigade.26
The Judicial Police are part of the Ministry of Interior but work within the Judiciary. They are the
investigative arm of the internal security forces with
responsibility for collecting evidence, conducting investigations, and writing the formal reports of the investigations for cases before the courts. The Judicial
Police do not have the tools to do professional investigations. According to Judiciary lawyers, the Judicial
Police do not have the capacity for fingerprinting,
DNA testing, or other means of collecting evidence.
Their investigations rely solely on confession. The
confession becomes the basis for the investigation
report, which is the sole means by which evidence is
submitted in the court before the judge. Under the Ben
Ali regime, the Judicial Police used violence and torture during their interrogations, both to extract confessions and to force the accused to sign the confessions. There is no provision for the presence of legal
counsel from the moment of arrest to the conclusion
of the investigation.27
The Presidential Guard Forces (PGF) are also part
of the Ministry of Interior. There are no reliable estimates or officially published records to determine the
14

size of the PGF. Their principle duty was to protect
the President and his family. During the demonstrations in January 2011, the Presidential Guard reportedly fired on demonstrators and battled the Tunisian
armed forces.28 The testimony of Ali Seriati, the former
Presidential Security Chief, during the trial for his role
in the deaths of protesters, revealed that the PGF had
not only snipers but also water cannons and other
crowd-suppression capabilities.29 This suggests that
the PFG’s mandate under Ben Ali was quite broad.
A strong current in Tunisian society seeks justice,
if not revenge. Many police fled as the government
collapsed, and others have remained in their homes
or elsewhere with family, fearing that there will be
retribution for their roles both before and during the
revolution. Some 250-300 police stations were burned,
and in several towns in the interior of Tunisia, the attacks took a more personal turn with the burning of
policemen’s homes.
The police are fearful that they will be targeted
for revenge or prosecuted for their roles in Ben Ali’s
security apparatus. This fear has limited their ability
to perform normal police functions. The sudden reversal from a position of power and respect to one of
weakness and derision has generated frustration, fear,
and anger. Police syndicates have organized strikes
to draw attention to their plight and to call for improved working conditions and government protection while on duty.30 These strikes have sparked large
counterdemonstrations with protestors shouting, “Go
Back to Work,” and carrying placards with slogans
like “People Want to Purge the Ministry of Interior.”31
Adel Jebali, a member of the National Union for Security Forces, one of the police syndicates, noted that
“people perceive us to be criminals.”32
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Tunisia has a great deal of police capacity. Senior
officers are often highly educated, and many have
attended police training academies in Europe. Educational standards are also quite high for entrance
into the police force. Police currently are educated
alongside military officers at the military academy,
although there is a proposal to create a separate police
academy. There is also a solid police infrastructure
(e.g., police stations, communications equipment, vehicles, and uniforms). Training is standardized, and
even Rules of Engagement have been established. The
problem is that all of these remain largely unchanged
from the Ben Ali regime. Under Ben Ali, the police
were responsible for serious human rights violations,
including illegal and arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions. According to a National Guard
officer, “The competence was there, but the climate
was terrible.”33
The current Minister of Interior, Ali Laarayedh,
was himself tortured during the 16 years he was jailed
by the Ben Ali regime. He is an interesting choice for
the Interior Ministry—one that the previously banned
Ennahda Party was at first hesitant to fill. After Ennahda won a plurality in the national elections and
began selecting cabinet members, some of the party
leadership were concerned that the appointment of an
interior minister from Ennahda would generate the
perception that the party was intent on revenge. The
party leadership was wary of a potential misstep that
could fuel further fear, particularly within the ministry and among its personnel. But in the run-up to the
October elections, two senior members of Ennahda,
both of whom had been imprisoned and tortured under Ben Ali, were invited to a meeting with interior
ministry officials and the leaders of the two police
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syndicates. The meeting had been arranged by the
syndicates, and the request was made that Ennahda
fill the position of the new Minister of Interior after
the elections.
This first meeting was followed by others, and the
two senior leaders began to engage regularly with the
syndicates. In a conversation over Ennahda’s intentions, the two Ennahda leaders reassured the attendees, telling them that despite being among the worst
tortured members of the Ennahda party, “We do not
hold it against you. We need reform,” they told their
audience. “We need to turn the page and look to the
future.” One of the Ennahda leaders recognized the
man who had tortured him in the audience. This man
asked his former victim, “Do you hate us?” The Ennahda leader said, “No. You were a screw within the
engine. If it wasn’t you, it would have been someone
else.”
In relating this story, the Ennahda leader emphasized that the party would “never allow anyone
to pursue revenge.” Moved to tears, he added, “I do
not want compensation for my suffering. . . . The only
thing that will save me is to see my country the way I
want. It would be a gross mistake if we fail to deliver
an inclusive system for everyone.”34
There are positive indications that reform of the
interior ministry has been a priority for Tunisia’s transitional governments. In May 2011, the MOI reached
out to the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of
the Armed Forces (DCAF) to undertake a preliminary
study of the Ministry’s communication with the public. The Communication Review, released in September 2011, offers a series of recommendations intended
to “restore confidence between citizens and security
forces.”35 In November, 2011, Le Labo’ Démocratique, a
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civil society group, together with DCAF, organized an
international conferences on the archives of the secret
police to help the MOI explore how best to manage the
archives and how to establish parliamentary control
over MOI intelligence capabilities.36
The most comprehensive plan for reform of Tunisia’s security sector is the Ministry of Interior white
paper, entitled “Security and Development: A White
Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia.”37 The report was released by Tunisia’s interim President,
Foued Mebazaa, and Akremi. Akremi was nominated
to the ministry in July 2011 to lead the reform effort
and was charged by the Minister of the Interior, Habib
El Essid, to draft a white paper with proposals for reform that would be specifically targeted to the needs
of Tunisia. Akremi called upon experts throughout
the ministry and from France, Spain, and Switzerland
to participate in drafting the proposal, and the draft
white paper was submitted for review to a seminar in
September 2011.38 The final document contains their
critiques.39
According to the white paper, the proposed reform
of the Tunisian security sector “can be summarized as
moving from a police order to a police service that can
respond urgently to the new challenges of crime.” To
achieve this objective, “all the levers of modernization
should be mobilized at the same time: reconciliation
of the National Police and the National Guard, redistribution of responsibilities between municipalities
and the state security services, and implementation of
local security, modernization of human resource management, optimization and sharing of material, and
finally, citizen control.”40
The report recognizes and addresses many of the
key issues for reform of the MOI. The opacity of the
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ministry with regard to its labyrinth security structures and actors is addressed through a reorganization of the security services into three bodies—the
National Guard, the National Police, and Civil Protection—and the merger of civilian and uniformed National Police.41 Recruitment and training are treated
extensively in a separate chapter, which recommends
the creation of a Tunisian police academy, new salary
hierarchies and career management mechanisms, and
an overall emphasis on professionalism and ethics
in recruitment, training, and advancement. Another
chapter is devoted to the public image of the security
services.
The report notes that no communication plan alone
can change a “bad image.” The MOI’s image will only
transform “when the professional practices of all its
agents are transformed.”42 Mechanisms to accomplish
this transformation include not only new uniforms
and open reception areas in police stations and guard
bureaus, but also new codes of conduct and greater
police transparency.43 Notable are the calls for reforms
of policy custody practices, police intelligence, and
techniques for video surveillance and electronic monitoring, and the banning of imprisonment for religious
or political ideas.
Currently, the white paper constitutes the only
sector-wide roadmap for reforming Tunisia’s security
sector. It clearly acknowledges and addresses the critical challenges in transforming the institution and culture of the MOI. Although the report was prepared by
the previous transitional government as an MOI input
for the work of the Constituent Assembly, it appears
unlikely that the new government will adopt its assessment and recommendations. When asked about
the utility of the white paper as a roadmap for reform,
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members of the Ennahda political bureau acknowledged that although the report contains useful suggestions, it is a product of the “old regime.” Ennahda
seeks to draw upon the expertise of a wide and inclusive group of experts, including not only Italian and
French, but also British, American, Swiss, and South
African, to develop a new SSR plan. Ennahda emphasized the importance of the inclusion of Tunisian experts because the model developed must ultimately
meet “their aspirations.”44
Intelligence Agencies. The Intelligence Agency is
part of the Ministry of Interior, although there are
also intelligence functions in the Ministry of Defense
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information on
the intelligence community is not widely available.
The white paper, however, devotes a final chapter
to intelligence reform. The report cautions that failure to reform the intelligence function will leave “a
small minority of decision makers” with a monopoly
of “the power of knowledge.”45 To guard against this
situation, the paper recommends creating a National
Intelligence Agency with clearly defined objectives
and a legal framework under which to operate. The
proposed agency would also be subject to strict controls at two levels—ministry control and parliamentary control.46 Personnel would include both military
and civilians. Domestic intelligence collection would
be prohibited.47 The Intelligence Agency would be removed from the MOI and report directly to the president of the republic.48
The Intelligence Agency would also have a coordinating function. The white paper proposes that
the agency coordinate collection and analysis for a
National Intelligence Council. This council would be
chaired by a head of state or head of government as
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determined by the future constitution and would include two members of the National Assembly.49 The
white paper also recommends creating a parliamentary committee in the National Assembly that would
include a few members with special clearances who
would exercise oversight of the agency’s activities
and its budget. Two parliamentary committee members would also serve on the National Intelligence
Council.50
There are currently no laws governing the intelligence sector.51 A sound legal framework is a precondition for effective, efficient, and accountable security
governance, particularly over the intelligence sector.
Tunisia will need a legal framework that defines the
roles and missions, the intelligence institutions and
functions, and the prerogatives and limits of the intelligence organizations and their members.52 Equally
important will be undertaking reforms with enough
transparency to build public trust and confidence in a
function intimately tied to the abuses of the previous
regime.
Governance and Democratic Oversight.
The second key piece of Tunisia’s security sector
is governance and democratic oversight. These are
found in the executive functions of Tunisia’s transition governments, the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the three national commissions, and the National
Constituent Assembly—the democratically elected
parliamentary body with a mandate to draft a new
constitution for the Republic of Tunisia.
The First Transition Government, January 17-February
27, 2011. The first transition government was created
in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure. On
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January 17, 2011, Prime Minister Mohammad Ghannouchi named a new interim unity government. The
19 ministers included six members of Ben Ali’s cabinet—including the three critical Defense, Interior and
Foreign Affairs Ministries—three opposition leaders,
and 10 independents. The interim government sought
to begin crafting a new narrative contrasting it with
its predecessors. In addition to including opposition
members in the government, promises were made to
free political prisoners and to include international
monitors at the upcoming elections; furthermore, political groups, including Islamist parties, were granted
amnesty. The transition government also created three
national commissions, which began work on January
19, 2011. (These will be discussed in further detail below). However, the participation of Ben Ali loyalists
sparked a new round of violent protests. Five ministers defected from the interim government soon after
it was formed, and Ghannouchi replaced the Ministers of Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs. Finally,
as protests continued to mount, Ghannouchi himself
resigned on February 27, 2011, and Beji Caid Essebsi, a
former foreign minister under Bourguiba, became the
new Prime Minister.53
The Second Transition Government, February 27December 24, 2011. The second transition government
under Beji Caid Essebsi sought to address protestors’
demands, particularly the charge that the dismantling
of Ben Ali’s security establishment was not moving
apace. He appointed a new cabinet largely comprised
of technocrats who had not served under Ben Ali’s
government. The new government announced the
dissolution of Ben Ali’s political police and his ruling
party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
(RCD), in March 2011.54 Despite progress, antigov-
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ernment protests and violent street battles in Tunis
reflected a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the pace
of change and fear that the new government would
revert to autocratic rule.
Yet, in the midst of ongoing protests, the second
interim government made two critical decisions: first,
to place constitutional reform ahead of elections; and
second, to delay the elections for a National Constituent Assembly from July to October 2011. The first decision ensured that the old constitution, which privileged the RCD and thus made free and fair elections
virtually impossible, would not return the old ruling
party or Ben Ali’s political establishment to power.
The second delayed the transitional period, so that reformist and opposition parties would be afforded the
opportunity to compete and to shape the drafting of a
new constitution for Tunisia.55
More than 90 percent of registered Tunisian citizens participated in what was Tunisia’s first truly
competitive election since it declared independence
from France in 1956.56 The previously banned Islamist
Ennahda Party won a plurality of 89 of the 217 seats in
the National Constituent Assembly.57
The Caretaker Government, December 23, 2011-present. The Ennahda Party combined with the secular
Congress for the Republic Party and the left Ettakatol
Party to form a caretaker government to run the country during the year-long period in which the Assembly
is charged with drafting a new constitution.58 Hamadi
Jebali, Ennahda’s secretary general, is the new Prime
Minister, and Moncef Marzouki, head of the Congress
for the Republic, holds the largely ceremonial post of
Tunisian President. At its first meeting, the Assembly
confirmed the selection of Mustafa Ben Jaafar, leader
of the Ettakatol party, as speaker of the new assembly.
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The new Prime Minister, Hamadi Jebali, proposed a
cabinet, which was approved on December 23, 2011.
Only the Minister of Defense, Abdelkarim Zbidi, remained unchanged from the previous cabinet.
The Constituent Assembly approved Tunisia’s new
government but did not stipulate when the government’s mandate would end. Given the 1-year mandate
for the drafting of the constitution, the assumption
was that elections would shortly follow completion
of the constitution in late 2012 or early 2013. But in
February 2012, Prime Minister Jebali announced that
elections would not be held until August 2013.59 One
month later, Jebali announced that elections would be
held no later than June 2013, and preferably on April
9, Tunisia Martyr’s Day.60 The delays may simply reflect the government’s recognition that drafting a new
constitution in only a year is not feasible (in South
Africa, the new constitution was drafted in 2 years).
However, civil society groups and opposition parties
have expressed concern over the government’s open
mandate. Former Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi
has called for the National Constituent Assembly to
respect the mandate to draft the constitution and prepare for elections within a period not exceeding October 23, 2012.
The Ministry of Defense. Civilian oversight and governance of the Tunisian Armed Forces are assigned to
the Tunisian MOD, led by a civilian Minister of Defense. The MOD is an almost entirely civilian organization. It has primary responsibility for the implementation of policy decisions regarding the uniformed
services. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is the
principle advisor to the Minister. The Chiefs of Staff
of each of the three services—Army, Air Force, and
Navy—command each of their respective services but
do not serve on a unified general staff. Coordination
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among the services is the responsibility of the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces.
The Ministry of Defense is comprised of the Ministerial Cabinet, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,
and the National Defense Institute, the senior military
defense university. The MOD oversees seven directorates for military justice, general conscription and
mobilization, central administration, personnel and
training, information and culture, military health, and
the “National Military Mutuality,” as well as the High
Committee of the Armed Forces, “specialized instruments,” technical departments, and military schools.61
The Minister of Defense’s specific authorities are
defined by a 1975 Presidential Decree, which specifies
that the Minister of Defense serves the President of
the Republic, who is the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces. The Minister of Defense has the task of
ensuring the security and integrity of national territory and the protection of people’s lives.
As in the case of the armed forces, the scope of
reform of the MOD is quite small. The Ministry will
need to adjust to a democratic system of governance
that will likely involve regular review and oversight
by parliamentary committees of the MOD and its
budget. This will require institutionalizing a culture
of oversight and adjusting processes and procedures
to accommodate external review. Yet, the need for
oversight is recognized and welcomed by the Ministry, suggesting that the MOD will not resist these
changes. Another likely reform will involve the inclusion of both civilians and military officers in the
drafting of national strategies and strategic planning,
a role that military officers did not fulfill in the Ben
Ali regime. Senior military officers are keen to fill the
role of subject matter experts and to support civilian
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decisionmakers, as their counterparts do in most democratic nations.
The Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior is
the proverbial black box of Tunisia’s security sector.
Successful SSR in Tunisia will ultimately hinge on the
establishment of real, democratically elected, civilian
oversight of the MOI. Tunisian human rights activists
characterize the current relationship between Minister
of Interior Laarayedh and his Ministry as “a war.”62
The standoff between the Minister of Interior and
the director of one of the ministry’s subordinate security forces in January 2012 dramatically underscores
this point. Laarayedh sought to remove Monsef Al
Ajimi, the Director of the Intervention Forces, from
his post. Ajimi had been formally accused of firing on
crowds in Thala during the revolution. But Ajimi had
the loyalty of some 12,000 police from the Bouchoucha Barracks, who physically blocked access to the accused director and then organized a strike in protest
of his attempted removal. Across Tunis, key installations were left with no Tunisian security presence,
including the embassies. One of the police unions intervened, persuading the strikers that their interests
were not being served by supporting a senior member
of the Ben Ali security apparatus—a man who had
fired on the people. The courts have not yet ruled on
the case, and although the strikes ceased, the Minister
of Interior was forced to move the accused director to
a consultant position elsewhere in the ministry.
Both the video release and the thwarted attempt
to fire the Director of the Intervention Forces suggest
that Laarayedh’s authority over the ministry—and
thus, the authority of the civilian transition government approved by the nationally elected Constituent Assembly—is quite limited. It also suggests that
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ministry officials are likely to resist efforts to reform
the Ministry, and, as the incident of the Intervention
Forces suggests, that they have the capacity and the
resources to do so. According to a legal activist engaged in promoting security sector reform, “Senior
officers in the MOI do not have the intention to do reform. Those senior officers are not collaborating with
the new government. They are resisting any reform
and are seeking to protect their interests, their positions, and themselves.”63
Three National Commissions. The three commissions
created within days of Ben Ali’s overthrow constitute
another important element through which civilian
authority over Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule
is exercised. The three commissions are the National
Commission to Investigate Violence During the Riots,
headed by Tawfik Bouderbala; the National Commission to Investigate Corruption, headed by Abdelfattah
Amor; and the High Commission for the Fulfillment
of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, headed by Iyadh Ben Achour.
The most important of these three commissions is
the High Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, headed by Ben Achour. Also known as the Ben
Achour Commission, it includes 154 technical experts,
legal advisors, and members of Tunisia’s political
parties and civil society. According to Albert Stepan,
“This Commission is one of the most successful and
consensual organizations in the history of crafting a
democratic transition.”64
The Ben Achour Commission began work on January 19, only days after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. On
April 11, 2011, members of the Commission approved
a number of documents that defined the post-Ben Ali
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transition to democratic rule, each of which was subsequently implemented. First was the decision to create
a Constituent Assembly to produce a new constitution
and to hold Tunisia’s first elections for seats in this
assembly. Second, the Commission agreed that the
Constituent Assembly would appoint a government
and that this government would be responsible to the
Constituent Assembly. Third, the Commission adopted a proportional representation electoral system
and required that party lists contain alternating male
and female candidates. Fourth, the commission invited international observers to monitor the elections
and created an independent electoral commission by
moving the Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les
Élections (ISIE) out of the Ministry of Interior. Finally,
the Commission agreed to dissolve the RCD and ban
some of its leaders from participation in the elections
for the Constituent Assembly. Other party members,
however, were permitted to form new parties and to
participate in the election.65
The commission appointed two other national
commissions to respond to civil society demands for
transparency and justice. The National Commission
to Investigate Violence During the Riots was headed
by Tawfik Bouderbala, the former president of the Tunisian Human Rights League. The Commission was
quickly overwhelmed with claims, even though the
Commission is limited only to the 2-to-3-month time
frame of the demonstrations immediately before and
during the revolution. The second commission, the
National Commission to Investigate Corruption, was
headed by Abdel Fattah, a Special Rapporteur for the
former UN Human Rights Committee and a political
science professor.66 All three commissions are currently at a standstill. The chair of the corruption committee
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died from an apparent heart attack, and the other two
commissions are awaiting guidance from the Constituent Assembly and the transitional government. The
National Commission to Investigate Violence During
the Riots will reportedly release its findings in latespring 2012.67
The National Constituent Assembly. During the
transitional period, the 217-seat National Constituent Assembly is Tunisia’s legislative body. It has a
clear mandate to draft a new constitution for Tunisia
during 2012. What is less clear is the interim government’s mandate for reform. Although the Constituent
Assembly approved the caretaker government headed
by Prime Minister Hemadi Jebali, this does not necessarily confer a mandate to reform the government or
the security sector before the Constituent Assembly
has drafted a new constitution and before elections for
a new government are held at a yet-to-be-determined
date in 2013.
The Constituent Assembly has made some progress. Its members adopted a “mini-constitution” in December 2011 that defines government and parliamentary authority until the new constitution is complete.
In mid-January, members also approved internal bylaws to govern the constitution-drafting process.68 Article 111 creates a commission to draft the constitution,
and, on January 18, 2012, Ben Jaafar was appointed
head of this commission. It coordinates the work of six
other committees that will focus on: 1) introduction,
basic principles, and constitutional review; 2) rights
and freedoms; 3) legislative and executive powers,
and relations between powers; 4) civil, administrative,
financial and constitutional justice; 5) constitutional
bodies, including all committees, focused on media
pluralism, financial regulation, separation of politics
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and religion, and law enforcement and security; and
6) local, regional and municipal issues.69 Particularly
encouraging was the adoption of transparency rules
during the constitution-drafting process. According to
Article 62, “Public information is the rule, secrecy is
the exception. It is up for the members of the committee to decide [when exceptions will be made].”70
Justice and the Rule of Law.
The third component of the Tunisian security sector consists of the justice functions as they relate to
the security sector and the rule of law. This includes
the Ministry of Justice and its prison regimes, the judiciary, and prosecution services.
The Ministry of Justice overseas the application
of Tunisian law, including the offices of the regional and national judiciary and the administration of
prisons and rehabilitation centers.71 According to a
1974 Presidential Decree, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for developing and implementing judicial
policy; drafting legislation and commenting on draft
legislation submitted by other ministries; drafting
international conventions; organizing and inspecting
judicial public services; and considering applications
for pardon, parole, rehabilitation, and revision.72 Subsequently, with the inclusion of ministry oversight of
the prison system and human rights, the ministry’s
functions also included the execution of sentences and
the promotion of human rights.73
The General Directorate of Prisons and Rehabilitation (GDSR), which oversees the Tunisian prison
system, is one of the subordinate organizations of the
Ministry of Justice.74 Interestingly, it is currently being
run by an Army Senior Colonel (one-star equivalent).75
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There are 35 confinement facilities under the GDSR,
including one prison housing strictly women and seven juvenile detention and rehabilitation centers.76 In
February 2011, a general amnesty law authorized the
release of 500 political prisoners.
The Tunisian Judiciary has three levels of regular courts—Cantonal, First Instance, and Appeals. At
the apex is the Court of Cassation. At each level, the
courts have sections for civil, commercial, criminal,
social, and personal status cases (there are no specialized Sharia courts). The High Court, according to Article 68, meets for cases of high treason committed by
a member of the government.77
According to Article 65 of the Tunisian Constitution, “The judiciary is independent; the magistrates in
the exercise of their functions are not subjected to any
authority other than the law.”78 In practice, however,
the executive has almost exclusive control over the
judiciary. The Tunisian president chairs the Superior
Council of Magistrates (Le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature), which recommends judges (magistrates); the
Tunisian president also appoints judges. The Minister
of Justice also serves on the Superior Council, and the
Ministry administers the judiciary and its budget and
determines the number of judges needed and their
assignments. Reportedly under Ben Ali, the Ministry
even determined case assignments and intervened
to ensure favorable rulings for members of the Ben
Ali establishment.79 The Minister of Justice can also
transfer judges and prosecutors without their consent
for punitive reasons or to intimidate. A recent European Union Justice Peer Review Report on Tunisia,
published in December 2011, recommends “immediate steps” to restore public confidence in the justice
system and the establishment of an independent and
effective justice system founded on the principles of
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judicial independence and the impartiality and irrevocability of judges and prosecutors.80
The prosecution system in Tunisia is largely judicial, and prosecutors are comparable to judges. Trials are by judge, not jury. Prosecutors are part of the
Ministry of Justice, although the Judicial Police, who
conduct investigations and prepare the report for
prosecution, are part of the Ministry of Interior. The
Youth Lawyers Association and the Lawyers Union
have proposed reforms of both the prosecutorial system and the role of the Judicial Police. One recommendation is to allow legal counsel to be present during
interrogations conducted by the Judicial Police. In
January 2012, association representatives met with the
minister of justice, who reportedly told them that it
was not possible to move away from an interrogationbased system. Reforming the prosecutorial system and
the Judicial Police, as these groups proposed, would
require training the police to conduct real investigations, transferring the Judicial Police to the MOJ and
training lawyers to advocate for their clients during
interrogation. The representatives concluded that the
enormous institutional obstacles and time constraints
limit the will to undertake serious political reform.81
The Lawyers Union and the Youth Lawyers Association are able to submit their proposed reforms to the
Constituent Assembly, particularly on issues relating
to judiciary reform and human rights laws. However,
they noted that the Assembly has not yet begun work
on these issues, since its focus has been on creating the
bylaws to govern the work of the Assembly.82
No equivalent white paper addresses the MOJ, but
some efforts are under way to assess prospects for the
reform of key subsectors. The number of active nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and international
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organizations (IO) efforts focused on justice sector reform suggests that the lack of a roadmap has not limited efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice appears to be
less of a black box than the MOI, although civil society
groups such as the Tunisian Human Rights League
question whether any of these efforts have produced
meaningful reform.83
One of the first groups to engage with the Ministry of Justice was the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Discussions eventually produced an agreement in October
2011. The scope of the DCAF effort with regard to
MOJ reforms includes institutional and legal reform
of the penitentiary and re-education system as well as
strengthening the capacity of the penitentiary and its
personnel.84 In late January, DCAF met with the Minister of Justice, Noureddine Bhiri, to discuss the implementation of the memorandum of understanding
between the ministry and DCAF for prison reform.85
The UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) are reportedly also engaged in training programs to support prison reform. The United States has
also sought to engage on the issue of prison reform,
but has not yet signed an agreement with the Tunisian
government.
DCAF has also worked with the Ministry of Interior to collect and catalogue laws and amendments
relating to the security sector. These texts have been
uploaded to an electronic database, accessible in both
Arabic and French, which was released to the MOI on
January 26, 2012. The index includes legislation relating to the traditional security providers (the military
and the police), the justice sector (the courts and prisons), as well as management and oversight of the se-
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curity sector (government, ministries, parliament, and
the courts). Legislation governing the work of political parties, the media, and NGOs was also included.86
This single, easily accessible, and searchable resource
for all laws and amendments pertaining to the security sector greatly enhances the transparency of the
legal framework governing the security sector.
Another reform initiative that has garnered international engagement is the training of prosecutors.
The UNDP-Tunisia has begun to develop a training
program, and the American Bar Association (ABA)
Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI) has also sought to offer
training for young attorneys that focuses specifically
on how to understand their role in a democratic society. Key issues include how to protect the rights of the
accused and the political rights of the public.
The challenge of how best to resolve the issue of
transitional justice is particularly pressing in Tunisia
as public frustration with the apparent lack of progress has grown. While there is a strong impulse for
revenge against those who were responsible for the
human rights abuses of the Ben Ali regime, there is
also widespread recognition that the numbers of individuals who were “tainted” by the Ben Ali regime are
so large that the process of bringing them all to justice
will likely stretch beyond the current 12-to-18-month
transition process. Many acknowledge that amnesty
is not politically possible, given the charged nature of
the issue today, but people from across the political
spectrum also agree that some form of amnesty will
be necessary to prevent the construction of a post-Ben
Ali Tunisia from being derailed. According to activists
at the Tunisian Human Rights League, “Tunisia can’t
have progress without some reconciliation with the
old regime, but the people won’t support it.”87
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Ennahda clearly recognizes the importance of judicial accountability for the crimes of the Ben Ali regime and created a new position in Jebali’s cabinet.
The new Minster for Transitional Justice and Human
Rights is Samir Dilou, a lawyer and member of the Executive Bureau of the Ennahda Party. Dilou is also an
Ennahda deputy in the Constituent Assembly and the
spokesperson for the Jebali government. Implementation of transitional justice is a key issue in the transitional government’s agenda. Given the depth of the
former regime’s corruption and its influence within
the judicial system, it remains a question whether justice can be achieved without first implementing extensive internal judicial reform.
A key issue is the corruption of the judicial system. Corruption was rampant, particularly in the last
five years of Ben Ali’s regime. As one activist noted,
“He fell so quickly because not a single family was untouched by the corruption.” The corruption extended
across the government, not just in the Ministries of
Justice and Interior, but also in the Ministries of Agriculture, Government Property, Commerce, and Industry, to name a few. “At the end,” the activist added,
“everyone was fed up with the corruption, even in the
government. This is why the revolution took only 2
days in Tunis. He [Ben Ali] fled because no one came
to his defense.”88 It will be essential to remove the coterie of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who were loyal
to the Ben Ali regime. Practices such as the fixing of
sentences before trial will need to be reformed.
Another critical issue for the reform of the justice
sector will be assessing whether the body of laws and
institutional guidelines sufficiently protect the rights
of all citizens and adequately constrain the authority
of government entities in accordance with the rule of
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law. Equally critical will be reforming the institutional
and operational culture of the ministry, the judiciary,
the prosecutorial services, and the prison system to
adhere to these laws and guidelines; training existing
personnel how to operate according to these guidelines; and recruiting and training new personnel to
fill the mission of the justice sector in accordance with
democratic governance and the rule of law.
However, within the Judiciary, and in stark contrast to the Ministry of Interior, there are some indicators that reform has begun. Judges and prosecutors
who were known to be corrupt are beginning to be
discharged. This is a promising beginning. A draft law
removing the President of Tunisia and the Minister of
Justice from the Superior Council is also being considered.89 According to Moussa Abdelsattar, the Director of the Tunisian League of Human Rights, there
are five issues that need to be addressed for there to
be justice in Tunisia. First, the regime needs to prosecute former regime officials who engaged in human
rights violations during the revolution. Second, there
needs to be reconciliation between these perpetrators
and their victims. Third, the government must establish standards for the adequate compensation of the
victims of the former regime. Fourth, it is necessary
to implement reform of the security apparatus, the judicial system, and the media. And, finally, there must
be assurances that the martyrs of the revolution will
be honored appropriately. According to Abdelsattar,
progress is being made only on the first element.90
Ennahda’s leadership has urged patience to allow
the judicial system to work and to allow reform of
the judicial system to begin to take effect. According
to Dilou, it is imperative that the government begin
implementing justice while at the same time purging
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the judiciary of corrupt elements from the former regime.91 Because the reform process will take time, “it
is imperative that we carry on both the reform process
and the transitional justice process simultaneously.”
Ennahda cannot ignore real demands for justice
from the former regime’s many victims, who mobilized to overthrow the regime and who expect the new
government to hold the perpetrators accountable. Yet,
Ennahda does not want to generate the perception
that the new government is after revenge. Nor does
it want to further undermine the ability of the police
to resume legitimate security functions, which will
in turn enable the military to return to the barracks.
Balancing these issues will require a transparent, inclusive, and incremental process to achieve legitimate
justice without making the passive supporters of the
Ben Ali regime into a new class of victims and sacrificing Tunisia’s present stability.
Civil Society.
The final piece of the Tunisian security sector map
is civil society, a broad category that includes the media, NGOs, trade unions, and human rights advocacy
institutions that promote democratic oversight and
transparency of the security sector for ordinary citizens.
Civil society is a bright point in the Tunisian security sector. Since the revolution, the number of civil
society groups has exploded. Civil society groups are
engaged in issues with relevance across the security
sector spectrum, and their efforts, together with public pressure, have been critical in pushing Tunisia’s
transitional regimes to move forward with reforms. A
few examples are worth noting.
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While the media have focused on the important
part that social networks played in the Tunisian
revolution, there are civilian institutions that existed
in Tunisia well before the revolution. One of these
institutions is the General Tunisian Workers Union
(UGTT). Its membership numbers in the hundreds
of thousands.92 The UGTT organized several strikes
during the decades of Ben Ali’s rule.93 Institutions like
the UGTT that survived the Ben Ali regime with their
legitimacy intact will be important actors during the
transition period and, unlike many of the new civil
society groups, are well organized and well known to
Tunisia’s citizens.
Tunisians have created new civil society groups to
push for transparency and accountability during the
transition. Two of these groups are Le Labo’ Democratique (The Democracy Lab) and OpenGovTN. The
Democracy Lab joined with DCAF to organize a conference on the management and disposition of the regime’s secret police files. OpenGovTN has focused its
activities on the transparency of the National Constituent Assembly and the inclusion of Tunisian citizens
during the constitution-drafting process, principally
through unrestricted access to Assembly proceedings.
Comprised of professional Tunisians and Tunisian
expatriates, the organization has developed a series
of transparency initiatives—a TV channel that broadcasts the Constituent Assembly meetings live; and
publication of the reports of various governmental
commissions, the records of the votes of each member
of the Constituent Assembly, the record of attendance
of Assembly delegates, and the record of the debates
and speeches of every member of the Assembly. One
goal of OpenGovTN is to provide citizens with information so that they can judge their representatives’
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competence and hold them accountable in subsequent
elections.
An explosion of media outlets is another positive sign of Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule.
Widely viewed as a mouthpiece of the Ben Ali regime,
the media are now adjusting to a freer climate after
decades of censorship and repression. The proliferation of cable, radio, and print media is a positive step
forward, but media companies claim that the government is dragging its heels during the licensing process. Ennahda has complained that the new Tunisian
media establishment has tended toward sensationalist journalism and that it has negatively portrayed the
achievements of the government.94 Some argue that
government scrutiny of the media is necessary because
the explosion of new media companies threatens journalistic integrity. Media advocacy groups such as the
International Freedom of Expression Exchange have
organized conferences on the role of the media in a
democratic society, access to information, and media
independence.95 Similarly, the Independent National
Authority to Reform Information and Communication (INRIC), which seeks “protection of the right of
the Tunisian people to a free, pluralistic and transparent media,” has submitted 14 recommendations for a
press code to the government and has engaged in advocacy to establish new regulations to reorganize the
media and to prevent the emergence of monopolies.96
Ennahda’s leadership has recognized the need for the
reform of government control of the media, and has
reached out to the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) as a potential model for Tunisia.97

39

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD
Successful democratic transitions require the
achievement of four key goals:98 First, sufficient agreement has to be reached about the political process
to produce an elected government. This has been
achieved. Second, the elected government must come
to power through a free and fair vote. This, too, has
been accomplished. Third, the government must have
de facto authority to generate new policies. This, too,
has been achieved by all three of Tunisia’s transition
governments. Fourth, the executive, legislative, and
judicial authorities of the new government cannot be
required de jure to share power with other bodies (for
example, the military, or in Tunisia, the police).99 This,
too, has been accomplished, although in practice the
government faces serious challenges asserting its legal authority over key elements of the Ben Ali regime,
notably the Ministry of Interior and, to a lesser extent,
the Ministry of Justice.
These accomplishments are remarkable. Tunisia
has achieved in 1 year what none of the other Arab
Spring states has been able to. This leaves Tunisia well
poised to undertake serious security sector reform.
Reform will be essential for Tunisia’s security sector
to transition from a black box whose raison d’être was
protecting the regime, to transparent and democratically accountable institutions whose primary mission
is to protect the people. There are four priority actions
to be accomplished:
1. The first priority is to restructure the internal
security services and the Ministry of Interior. The
labyrinth of internal security institutions and the lack
of transparency over the most basic issues—a ministerial organizational chart, official numbers of interior
forces—suggest that reform of the internal security
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sector must begin with a mapping of the institutions,
the forces, and the personnel and assessing exactly
what is required for effective reform. The white paper is a good start. The caretaker government should
draw on the expertise of Tunisian and international
experts to ensure that the mapping and assessment
of the internal security forces and the Ministry of Interior are robust and that the proposed reforms meet
Tunisia’s security needs. With greater transparency in
place, it will be possible to address the three remaining reforms.
The first is establishing democratic oversight over
the Ministry of Interior, to include executive oversight
by the minister and parliamentary oversight over the
ministry’s practices, budgets, and reform plans. Implementing these reforms will require a fundamental
reorientation of the ministry’s institutional culture
and mission. The second needed internal security sector reform is divesting, reorganizing, and retraining
the internal security and police forces to create a new
police service that conducts humane, accountable, responsive, and capable policing. The third necessary
reform is resolving the Ministry of Interior and the
police forces’ “image problem.” The white paper suggests new uniforms, new logos, and more welcoming
reception areas in police stations. These are important
tangible indicators of change. They must be accompanied by real change; that is, fundamental reorientation
in how the ministry and its forces engage with citizens
and with the democratically elected executive authorities and parliament. The restoration of police services
will also help restore both the confidence of the police
and the public’s trust in the government.
2. A second priority is to establish the governance
and democratic oversight of the security sector. The
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creation of bylaws to govern the constitution-drafting
process, and recognition that the process needs to be
transparent, are positive developments. As the National Constituent Assembly begins drafting a new
constitution, critical issues for SSR include creating
the legal framework that establishes permanent oversight by both the executive and the parliament over
the security sector. A central element of this framework will be the creation of parliamentary committees on defense, security, and intelligence. One of
the recently created constitutional commissions has
drafting authority for the committees on law enforcement and security. A particular challenge during the
coming year is how this oversight, particularly of the
reform efforts of the security sector, will be conducted
while the new constitution is being written. The one
institution with a true electoral mandate during the
transitional period is the National Constituent Assembly. Its oversight over the reform process during this
transitional year will be important for the legitimacy
of the SSR in Tunisia.
3. A third priority is to reform the justice sector,
including the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, and
prosecution services. Because there is no roadmap yet
for the reform of the justice sector, developing an assessment is a good place to start. Discussions have already begun over prison reform and prosecutor training. The role of the Judicial Police and the apparent
lack of investigative capabilities either in the MOI or
the MOJ are clear priorities, and international technical assistance and training might be useful to begin addressing these gaps. As in the MOI, Ministry of Justice
reform will likely require reorienting the institutional
culture of the ministry and retraining judges, prosecutors, lawyers, court clerks, notaries, bailiffs, and many
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others. This is an enormous project that could well
stretch over a decade.
4. The final priority is to manage the difficult issue
of transitional justice. Although transitional justice is
not itself part of security sector reform, it is intricately
connected to it. Transitional justice involves resolving difficult, and often emotional, issues that resonate
throughout Tunisia, including whether to prosecute
members of the former Ben Ali regime, and if so, who
exactly should be prosecuted; whether to purge the
ministries and which ones; and whether and how to
compensate the victims of the former regime. How
transitional justice is addressed in Tunisia will have
great bearing on how SSR efforts proceed.
Closely related to transitional justice is the way to
vet the state administration across all the ministries,
but particularly Interior, Justice, and the Judiciary.
The MOI’s inability to remove senior officials in the
ministry suggests that civilian control over the ministry is a pressing issue. The lack of judicial independence, particularly the executive’s authority over the
appointment, reassignment, and promotion of judges
and prosecutors is another challenge. The vetting of
the state administration is a delicate issue that involves
balancing the need to purge certain key positions or
senior levels of individuals tainted by the former regime against the risk of creating a new aggrieved minority—if the purges are too extensive—or of losing
the ability to deliver major services. In the case of the
Judiciary, the risk is to undermine the legitimacy of
the judicial system and the rule of law.
Another related question is whether to prosecute
those individuals who are to be purged and others for
their activities under the previous regime, or to grant
them amnesty. Transitional justice can provide a good
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foundation for longer-term judicial reform. Support
from international experts with experience managing transitional justice elsewhere might be useful, if
the Tunisian leadership should request the expertise.
Ennahda’s leadership is certainly aware of the challenges, and has taken great pains to emphasize that
anything that smacks of revenge will be counterproductive. Ennahda seeks reconciliation, not revenge.
That SSR is a highly political process is frequently
underappreciated. In any political process, there are
winners and losers, and the potential losers of Tunisian SSR were among the most privileged in Tunisian
society. What is frequently overestimated is the value
of security. The assumption is that once basic security
is restored, “the rest will fall into place.” This is by
no means a necessary given. While Tunisia’s relatively
smooth transition from revolution to a democratically
elected caretaker government is remarkable, much remains to be done. Serious reform of the security sector
remains essential if Tunisia’s transition to democratic
rule is to succeed in the long term.
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